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1. Introduction: the need for social sciences research about the circular economy 
In particular in the European Union and China, the transition to a circular economy (CE) has over the 
last decade surfaced as one of the guiding ideas for the restructuring of economies towards resource 
efficiency and sustainability. The circular economy is presented as an alternative to the current linear 
take-make-dispose economy, in which it is implicitly assumed that natural resources are abundant and 
cheaply available (Linder, 2017). The EU has embraced the transition to a circular economy as one of 
its main future projects in the field of environmental and sustainability policy and a necessity for 
realizing the EU’s 2050 vision of “living well within the limits of our planet” (EU, 2013). The fast growing 
interest in the circular economy has several roots, such as a concern over availability of and growing 
competition for resources  (OECD 2008), reduction of environmental pressures and the challenge of 
managing high waste volumes (EEA, 2010), restructuring EU economies and making them more 
competitive, fostering growth and generating jobs (EC, 2015). The growing popularity of the CE 
concept, has also sparkled an academic literature about the CE transition. The overwhelming majority 
of scientific publications about the CE is situated in fields such as environmental sciences, engineering, 
technology, management and economics. The image that flows from this literature is a future where 
new technologies optimize material chains and close material loops, innovative business models 
replace products by services, product design enhances longevity and reparability, and consumers 
become users for whom sharing is the new owning (EMF, 2015).  
Apart from economics, the input of social and political science perspectives in this academic debate is 
very limited. Interestingly, the few studies that are available from a socio-political perspective often 
point to underlying tensions and controversies about what the CE exactly is, how it should be brought 
about, who the responsible actors are, who is to win and who will lose, and what the relevant 
technological and scientific research pathways are (Blomsma and Brennan, 2017; Gregson et al., 2015; 
Lazarevic and Valve, 2017 ; Hobson and Lynch, 2016; Moreau et al., 2017; Welch et al., 2017). Lazarevic 
and Valve (2017) for example observe that the narratives of the CE diverge between either radical 
change where the fundamentals of the European economy are reworked and paradigms that prevail 
since the industrial revolution are broken, or a situation where only business models are innovated 
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remaining within current market criteria and without radical changes to institutions, infrastructures 
and markets. Also Hobson and Lynch (2016) ascertain that the CE is potentially disruptive, but that 
within the EU,  the CE’s current framing echoes ecological modernist arguments that do not 
fundamentally change the status quo in terms of power, norms and politics. Gregson et al. (2015) 
summarize the need for political research on the CE eloquently when stating that the CE has “more 
often been celebrated than critically interrogated”. 
This paper is rooted in the observation that while the concept of the circular economy has become a 
guiding vision for policymakers and business with potentially deep societal impacts (EEA, 2016), its 
politics have hardly been investigated or discussed. Furthermore, although the transition to a CE is 
increasingly embraced at different levels of governance (from the international to the local level) and 
by different social actors (in government, business, ngo’s, science), the practice and implementation 
of the CE are still in an early stage. In practice, the linear economic model is still overwhelmingly 
dominant. This implies that the actual translation of the CE in policies, institutions, technologies, 
business models and daily practices, can still guide us towards different future circular economies, 
depending on the societal and political choices that are made. The transition towards  a circular 
economy is thus not merely a techno-scientific issue, but it shows how techno-scientific innovation is 
inextricably bound up with questions of social arrangements and institutions, power and exclusion, 
and normative, societal preferences (Wacjman, 2006).  
The lack of political analysis of the CE, combined with the fact that the CE is pervaded with techno-
scientific and economic concerns, is taken in this paper as a starting point to understand the 
development of the circular economy as a question of sociotechnical controversies and transition 
politics. In fact, the circular economy can be studies as an emerging socio-technical transition, with its 
deep interweaving of  technoscientific, economic and political questions and controversies. 
Importantly, we start from the hypothesis that the circular economy is not like any other policy 
ambition, but that it can best be described as an example of what, from an STS-perspective, Jasanoff 
and Kim (2009) have labelled a “sociotechnical imaginary”: a collective reimagining of social lives and 
social order, interlinked with and reflected in the design and fulfilment of new scientific and 
technological projects, goals and strategies.  Sociotechnical imaginaries are “visions of what is good, 
desirable, and worth attaining for a political community; they articulate feasible futures” (ibid., 122). 
They are “at once descriptive of attainable futures and prescriptive of the futures that ought to be 
attained” (ibid., 120) and of the role of technology and science therein. In that way they do something, 
they are performative, in the sense that they mobilize actors and they exercise political power, such 
as through informing and shaping of trajectories of research and innovation, through mobilization of 
resources or through legitimation of policy measures. Before a particular imaginary stabilizes and 
becomes dominant, there are usually a range of potential or emergent visions, that are competing for 
influence, each of which could potentially become dominant (Birch, 2016). The question then becomes 
how and which sociotechnical imaginary becomes dominant and what this implies in terms of actors, 
policies, technologies, power, practices and so on. 
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Building on this reasoning, the paper asks two questions: which sociotechnical imaginaries are shaping 
the circular economy? And how do specific sociotechnical imaginaries gain prominence over others, in 
particular in policy processes?  
Empirically, we take the developments in Flanders (Belgium) over the last decade as an example. As in 
most industrialised countries, Flanders has since the seventies developed a waste policy guided by the 
imaginary of a waste hierarchy, in the process co-producing specific policies, institutions, technologies 
and social practices. Over the last 10 years, this dominant regime has come under increasing pressure, 
in particular since in 2012 the Flemish Government initiated a new governance structure to launch a 
sustainable materials Program (early 2017 relaunched as Circular Economy Flanders), alongside the 
existing waste regime, with the ambition of replacing the waste regime by a circular economy.  
 
2. Methodologic choices  
Research building on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries has often shown the importance of 
policy development and legislation when explaining how imaginaries gain influence (….). Therefore, to 
understand how and which imaginaries gain influence, we build in this paper on theories of the policy 
process, and more in particular on a critical perspective on the multiple streams framework (MSF), 
(Barbehön et al., 2015) which combines the MSF (Kingdon 1984/2011) with discourse analysis (Hajer, 
1995, 2006). We have used this combination before (Paredis, 2013) and found it helpful in 
understanding how problems and solutions are interpreted and constructed by different actors in a 
policy process, how some of these interpretations gain power over others, reach the policy agenda 
and are translated in new policies, legislation, projects, subsidies and so on.  
The MSF was developed by Kingdon (2011 [1984]) to explain how policy issues reach the governmental 
agenda. The governmental agenda is the list of subjects to which people in and around government 
are paying serious attention at any given time. Agendas are influenced by two kinds of factors: 
participants that are active in and around government, and processes that bring subjects to 
prominence (ibid., p. 19). 
According to Kingdon, two broad categories of participants play a role in influencing agendas (p.69): a 
visible and a hidden cluster. The visible cluster are participants that receive a lot of press and public 
attention, such as ministers, prominent members of parliament, media figures. The relatively hidden 
cluster consists of different kinds of experts: academics, civil servants, parliamentary staffers, and not 
in the least in the Belgian and Flemish context the personal advisors (cabinet) of the Minister. Interest 
groups travel between the two, with some activities very public and other hardly visible. 
The second factor of influence on agendas are three process streams that flow through the system: a 
stream of problems, of policies and of politics. The problem stream contains all conditions that become 
interpreted as problems. Agendas are influenced when some participants succeed in getting more 
attention for one problem than for another. In the policy stream, ideas, proposals and alternatives 
float around in what Kingdon compares to “a primeval soup” (p.117). Here, a community of specialists 
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is active that interacts and discuss a whole range of problems and solutions. With the functioning of 
the policy stream, Kingdon stresses the importance of ideas as an integral part of decision-making. 
Policy-making is thus not only a matter of interests, power and strategy, but also of ideas and their 
influence. The political stream is determined by elections, changes in government, a new balance of 
power in parliament, swings in the mood of the public, interest group pressure campaigns. 
Developments in this stream have powerful effects on agendas. When for example a government 
changes, new items move up the agenda more easily. 
The three streams develop and operate largely independently of one another, governed by different 
forces, different considerations, different styles, different people (p. 88). Then when do new items gain 
importance and how do agendas change? According to Kingdon, coupling of the streams is essential 
for moving items up the agenda. Often, partial couplings are possible, e.g. a problem demands 
attention and a policy proposal can be coupled to it as a solution, but it might well be that the political 
climate is not ripe to take a decision. But when the three streams can be coupled in a single package – 
a problem demands attention, a policy solution is available, and the political climate is receptive – then 
the chances are “dramatically increased” that an item rises on the decision agenda (p. 178). 
The moment and opportunity for pushing change, is called a policy window by Kingdon. A policy 
window is the period of time during which it becomes a lot easier for advocates of particular policy 
solutions or of particular problems to push their ideas. During these windows, so-called policy 
entrepreneurs play an important role. Policy entrepreneurs are advocates of certain problems or 
solutions that are willing to invest resources (time, energy, reputation, money) to promote their cause, 
either because of their concern for specific problems, their policy values, or for personal benefits. They 
are central in the coupling of streams: “They hook solutions to problems, proposals to political 
momentum, and political events to policy problems (…) Without the presence of an entrepreneur, the 
linking of streams may not take place” (p. 182). 
In general, Kingdon stresses that his model shows how policy change does not proceed neatly in stages 
or phases. There is some “messiness, accident, fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck” involved, so that 
“subjects sometimes rise without our understanding completely why” (p. 206). Still, it would be wrong 
to view the process as completely random: the different streams have their own internal logic (e.g. not 
every proposal will surface in the policy stream because selection criteria are at work), there are limits 
on coupling possibilities (e.g. because of timing) and various rules of the game and institutions provide 
a basic structure for the actors that are involved. 
Barbehön et al. (2015) have argued that even though approaches to public policy-making such as 
Kingdon’s recognise that policy development is messy and does not follow a linear logic, they are still 
embedded in an objectivist epistemology, in the sense that they give the impression that agenda-
setting is about choosing and selecting between diverse problems and solutions, rather than 
recognising that policy problems and solutions are not “given”, but discursively constructed, implying 
struggles over definitions of the problem and the solutions, as well as the recognition of what counts 
as relevant problems and solutions. This also implies the mobilisation of power to advance actor’s 
favoured solutions and to try and build coalitions around them. 
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A useful approach to understanding the role of ideas is Hajer’s take on discourse analysis and the 
analytical concepts he distinguishes. Hajer defines a discourse as” an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomenon, and which is produced 
and reproduced through and identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006). When actors share a 
discourse, this can be  very functional for creating a political coalition and producing meaningful 
political interventions. Discourse coalitions are then groups of actors that share the usage of a 
particular set of storylines over a particular period of time. Hajer uses a two-step procedure to assess 
whether a discourse becomes dominant and has influence on policy. The first step is to look for 
discourse structuration: the extent to which different actors adopt the discourse and conceptualise the 
world through it. The discourse becomes dominant when ever more actors have to rely on its ideas 
and concepts to be credible in policy debates. The second step is investigating discourse 
institutionalisation: the extent to which policy practices and policy institutions change because of the 
new discourse. Examples include the setting up of new organisations or the reorganisation of existing 
ones, introduction of new instruments (measurement system, subsidies…), new legislation, etcetera. 
Hajer argues that when many people use a particular discourse to conceptualise the world (discourse 
structuration) and if it solidifies into institutions and organisational practices (discourse 
institutionalisation), then a discourse has become dominant and changes policy (ibid.). 
We use this combination of MSF and discourse analysis to analyse how the idea of the circular economy 
has gained a place in Flemish policy and which interpretations of the CE are fighting for influence. The 
story starts around 2005 and ends early 2017. The reconstruction of this story builds on a combination 
of document study, interviews and extensive participatory observation. For the period until early 2012, 
we draw on a reinterpretation of the analysis in Paredis (2013); for the period mid 2012-2017, we are 
currently still working on interviews and document analysis, but provide in this paper a preliminary 
storyline. 
 
3. A case study: a decade of steps towards a circular economy in Flanders 
This part makes a reconstruction of the emergence of the circular economy in Flanders over the last 
decade. It starts, however, in the 1970s when the basis was laid for the current waste system.  
3.1. 1970s – early 2000s: the waste hierarchy as the organising principle for waste policy 
When in the 1970s industrial societies were confronted with the modern environmental problem, 
waste was one of the first items on the agenda and it has remained there ever since. Just like in other 
countries, Flanders started from a chaotic waste situation in the 1970s. After the second World War, 
the booming economic activity and the rise of the consumer society were accompanied by an 
enormous increase in the volume of waste, while also the nature of waste changed drastically (e.g. 
through the introduction of plastics). Like other industrialised countries, until the late 1960s early 
1970s Belgium had a waste system that was still locally organised. Waste collection was the 
responsibility of municipalities and most waste was carried off to landfills or incinerated. This system 
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could no longer handle the waste streams that flowed from the booming economy. Of great 
importance for the development of waste policy was the introduction of an EEC Directive in 1975 
(C75/442/EEG) that obliged member states to create authorities for control of waste, planning, policy 
coordination and granting of permits. 
It took until 1980 to develop a serious waste policy in Flanders. At that time, the Belgian state was 
reformed and a lot of environmental and nature policy competences transferred towards the regions 
(Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels). Waste and water policy were the first domains of the new Flemish 
environmental powers to be developed (Loots et al., 2008). The basic rules of the new policy domain 
were laid down in the Afvalstoffendecreet (the Waste Decree) of 2 July 1981. From the start of waste 
policy, the discourse on waste mentioned the waste hierarchy: policy should first focus on waste 
prevention, followed by re-use as second best option, next recycling of products and materials or 
valorisation by conversion in compost, then incineration with energy recovery, incineration without 
energy recovery, and as the worst option landfilling. In practice, during the first decade the 
government and the Flemish Waste Agency OVAM tried to get a grip on the chaotic waste situation 
(with e.g. more than 400 landfills of which a lot were illegal) by reorganising landfilling and incineration 
practices. From the nineties onwards, there is an increasing focus on selective collection and recycling. 
This prioritisation is legitimised by a storyline that says that Flemish waste policy is moving up the 
waste hierarchy step by step. It is implied that when policy reaches the stage of prevention, the waste 
problem will be under control. By the 21st century, Flanders is considered one of the leading examples 
in the world for the organisation of its waste system, its high degree of collective selection and 
recycling, and its relatively limited amount of landfilling and incineration. The evolution in waste policy 
goes hand in hand with a changing interpretation of waste: while waste was primarily a societal and 
policy problem in the seventies and eighties, it has now become an economic good that forms the basis 
of the recycling industry. The vision on production, consumption and waste is mainly linear: waste is 
the unavoidable last phase of the production-consumption chain and should be dealt with as efficiently 
as possible. 
As mentioned, the rules of the system were laid down in the Waste Decree (1981, with a revision in 
1994), that was translated through sectoral implementation plans and accompanied by instruments 
such as the acceptance obligation and voluntary environmental policy agreements with industry. The 
dominant actor in the system was the Flemish waste agency OVAM, but also municipalities played an 
important role. The private sector is structurally involved in the waste chain, in particular in the market 
of industrial waste, and offered a package of services covering each link in the chain, from waste 
collection to processing of waste. The growing role of the private sector since the nineties and the 
resources they have brought in, caused a shift in power to individual large companies and sectoral 





3.2.  2002-2005: First steps in breaking open the system: the introduction of materials 
policy and of transition management 
While Flanders scored well in recycling, waste prevention policies were not successful and the total 
amount of waste, in particular the industrial segment, was not under control. To break through the 
standstill in policy and formulate a more ambitious vision, in the first years of the new century, civil 
servants at OVAM started thinking about a broader orientation. 
“The feeling was that there was a standstill in policy. We were not going to reach our goals by better 
selective collection and more recycling, but we had to work much more upstream in the chain (…) We 
realised we also had to look at production processes, at the design phase, and that’s how the idea of 
materials policy grew” (civil servant OVAM). 
Using Kingdon’s framework as an interpretive lens, this can be considered as a crucial topic in the 
problem stream, demanding attention. There was also a second problem confronting waste policy. 
During a huge reorganisation of the Flemish administration, inspired by New Public Management 
principles, OVAM has secured for itself the competence of waste prevention under the confusing term 
“resource flow management”, later interpreted as “materials policy”, but it was unclear how this 
should be organised and what its contents were to be.  
Was there also something happening in the policy stream? Around 2002, several civil servants, 
researchers and policy advisors, had become aware of the concepts of transitions and transition 
management (through research reports or in the preparation of policy advice) and had started 
regarding them as promising concepts for policy renewal. In this period, several of them also went to 
visit professor Jan Rotmans and his team at ICIS Maastricht to discuss the new concepts. Specifically 
for waste policy, under the impulse of an OVAM official, a study was ordered from ICIS Maastricht 
(Rotmans, Loorbach) about the potential of transition management for the reorientation of waste 
policy. The study concluded in 2003 that a sustainable materials perspective had potential to tackle 
the existing problems in the waste system and that transition management was a promising concept 
to initiate renewal of policy. In June 2004, OVAM’s Board of Directors adopted the conclusions of the 
report and decided to defend them with the new Minister of the Environment. 
Meanwhile in the political stream, the overall mood in environmental policy-making became more 
supportive of long-term policy-making and sustainable development after green Ministers entered the 
Flemish government in 1999. During his very last day in office, in July 2004, the Green minister of the 
Environment approved the start of a transition management process in sustainable housing and 
building. The Greens did not return to the Flemish government after the elections of 2004, but the new 
christian-democrat Minister of the Environment retained the idea of transition management and 
introduced it in his Policy Note 2004-2009 (published in December 2004) as an experiment in 
“innovative environmental policy”. The Note also introduces “the development of materials policy” as 
one of the operational objectives under the heading “innovative environmental policy” : materials 
policy should stimulate eco-efficient production in Flemish companies and thinking in material flows 
should be introduced in economic and environmental policy.   
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The coupling of streams happened in consecutive steps. As mentioned, in June 2004 OVAM’s Board of 
Directors accepted the idea of materials policy and the potential of transition management as a policy 
approach. Half a year later in December 2004, the Minister’s Policy Note introduced “the development 
of materials policy” under the heading of innovative environmental policy. In 2005, he also approves 
the start of a transition management process in sustainable materials management. In the same 
period, OVAM introduces in its Strategic Plan 2005-2009 a new and separate policy field alongside 
waste management, namely materials policy. The Plan takes as one of its operational goals the 
realisation of a transition process, and mentions that this choice is furthermore an execution of the 
Minister’s choice to test the implementation of TM in Flanders. 
3.3. 2006-2011: from waste policy to sustainable materials policy 
This combination of decisions initiated the start of transition management process in June 2006, called 
Plan C. OVAM’s purpose with Plan C was giving content to the new competence of materials policy and 
developing a long-term policy orientation for the waste system. The process closely followed the steps 
as are known from the scientific literature on transition management (Loorbach, 2007). It started with 
a transition arena of around 15 frontrunners, later extended to around 80 people from government, 
industry, science and ngo’s. Between June 2006 and May 2008, this group develops a future vision for 
a materials system in which Flemish society handles resources, materials and energy responsibly and 
with care. Resources and materials will be treated as common goods. They are managed and controlled 
over the whole of the life cycle in cooperating networks or clusters of producers, processing companies 
and consumers. The materials system will function as a subsystem of a service economy: people do no 
longer measure their happiness on the basis of the property of material products, but on access to 
services that are embedded in the social and natural environment. The central storyline around which 
the participants unite “is a high-grade closing of the material loops. We will not use less material 
products, but the new resources needed have to decrease drastically. This can be realized either by 
closing the loop in the biosphere and/or in the technosphere” (Van Acker, 2009). In order to realise 
that vision, Flanders has to invest in five transition paths: smart closing of material cycles; development 
of smart, renewable and reusable materials; the development of a service economy; green synthetics; 
and responsible, critical consumers.  
A closer look at this discourse reveals that the central storyline is in fact a typical ecological 
modernisation ideal, with confidence in reaching a more sustainable society through market 
mechanisms, technological innovation, industry, and without fundamentally challenging economic 
growth or consumption. The majority of storylines in Plan C are in this vein, such as: getting the prices 
right, fast technology development and diffusion, new types of materials and products (renewable, 
reusable, modular), product-service combination, closed materials loops, not less consumption but 
better consumption, strategic availability of resources for the Flemish economy, Flanders as expertise 
centre in sustainable materials management. However, some elements of the vision refer to more 
radical change and can be characterised as ‘transformational’: they seem to require changes in the 
economic and power structures of our society and also in cultural attitudes (Hopwood et al., 2005, 
Paredis, 2011). Elements of this transformational vision include: materials as a commons with new 
property regimes, integrity and common responsibility for materials, materials and technology 
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development as functional for societal needs, absolute decoupling of economic growth from resource 
use, common knowledge infrastructure, no social or ecological burden shifting worldwide. 
Was Plan C influential? The transition management approach that Plan C applied thus successful in 
creating a network of actors with the ambition of laying the foundations for a sustainable materials 
system in Flanders. Probably the most important result of Plan C was the discursive renewal it realised 
in Flanders between 2006 and 2008: it formulated a discourse on sustainable materials management 
in which waste is part of a broader materials system. Certainly until 2008, Plan C was the main voice in 
Flanders on sustainable materials management. Plan C was not able to keep that position after 2009, 
which can partly be explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network (such as limited 
funding and a lack of entrepreneurship for realising experiments). However, the changed position of 
Plan C was mainly due to striking changes in the Flemish waste regime itself: not only the regime 
discourse shifted to a materials orientation, but also new legislation – a Materials Decree as a 
replacement of the Waste Decree – was installed in 2011 that further institutionalised the discourse 
and laid foundations for new rules of the game. Kingdon’s model is again helpful in understanding how 
the coupling between problem formulations, policy solutions and political opportunities has been 
crucial for realising this policy change (for a schematic representation of the following discussion, see 
the figure below).  
Let us start from the observation that Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about 
sustainable materials management and in starting a network of frontrunners that at least until 2008 
was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management. 
Several OVAM policy officers were not only participants in the Plan C process, but were also involved 
in internal OVAM discussions on the translation of the results and their implications for OVAM’s own 
policy orientation and organisation. As already mentioned, “materials policy” appeared in the strategic 
plan of OVAM for 2005-2009 – around the same time that the Plan C process was prepared – as a third 
policy line for OVAM alongside waste management and soil management. Slowly, within OVAM the 
insight grew that materials management should not be regarded as a third policy line, but that the 
waste system should be regarded as part of a ‘higher’ system, the materials system. 
A crucial breakthrough was the realisation within OVAM that this line of thinking implied that the 
obligation, coming from the EU-level, to translate the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) into 
new Flemish legislation, should not simply lead to a new Waste Decree, but that the new Decree should 
somehow reflect the materials storyline. In fact, the EU Directive’s main aim was to strengthen the 
waste hierarchy in the waste policies of the EU member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste 
policies between member states. But inspired by the experiences with Plan C and by similar discourses 
at EU and OECD level, OVAM proposed to the Flemish Minister of the Environment to translate the 
Directive into a Materials Decree instead of into a new Waste Decree, in that way going several steps 
further than the EU required (and than the ambitions of most EU member states). Although the ideas 
of how this should be done, were far from mature, this argumentation found a sympathetic ear at the 
cabinet of the Minster of the Environment. During the negotiations for a new Flemish Government in 
2009, the cabinet succeeded in inserting the idea into the Governmental Declaration where it is stated 
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that the new government will “broaden waste policy to sustainable materials policy (…) The translation 
of the new Waste Framework Directive will amongst other things anchor the evolution from waste to 
integrated materials management” (Vlaamse Regering 2009, p. 58-59). The coinciding streams of the 
EU-level and the Flemish elections thus opened a policy window where the sustainable materials 
storyline could be inserted. The preparatory work of OVAM’s entrepreneurial civil servants, including 
the translation of the discourse development in Plan C, shows throughout the case, but also here the 
combination with the adoption by the political level (such as during the governmental negotiations of 
2009) was an essential factor. 
 
Figure 6.4. Plan C and the Flemish materials transition. A schematic, simplified presentation of coupling of 
problem streams (in red), policy streams (in green) and political streams (orange) during policy windows (blue). 
See text for details. 
 
The shift from waste to materials policy had now reached the governmental agenda, but it took two 
more years to rise on the decision agenda and make it ripe for an “authoritative decision” (in Kingdon’s 
phrasing). What is interesting here, is that Flanders had no choice but to translate the EU Waste 
Framework Directive into regional legislation. So, the decision moment would come anyway, and could 
perhaps be interpreted as a kind of “enforced policy window” through the influence of a higher 
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authority2. Flanders was however not obliged to take the step to a Materials Decree and to go beyond 
well-known waste policies and the waste hierarchy. But after the Governmental Declaration of July 
2009 and during the next two years, different opportunities arose and different streams could be 
coupled that strengthened the adoption of the materials discourse and anchored it further at political 
and administrative level.  
One evolution is situated in the problem stream, where in the course of 2009 and 2010 we see a fast 
rising awareness of the urgency of addressing the resources and materials problem, due to the rising 
demand for resources worldwide (e.g. from China), the import dependency of EU-countries, and the 
rising prices of resources. Apart from OVAM itself and Plan C, important new players in the Flemish 
materials system such as the sector federations Agoria (technology industry) and Essenscia (chemical 
industry) actively drew attention to these problems and demanded government action. Also EU 
initiatives such as the Raw Materials Initiative (EC, 2008), which grew out of anxiety over the availability 
of resources for the European economy, increased the awareness for the problem. 
Another element, part of the political stream, was the preparation and development of the new 
Strategic Plan 2010-2014 for OVAM. In the strategic plan, waste and materials are no longer regarded 
as separate policy lines – as was the case in the previous Strategic Plan 2005-2009 – but waste policy 
has become part of sustainable materials policy. The new plan was accompanied by an internal 
reorganisation of OVAM, meant to prepare the organisation for its role in the future materials 
economy. 
Also important in the political stream was the Belgian presidency of the EU during the second half of 
2010. The Flemish Minister for the Environment became responsible for the presidency of the EU 
Environment Council. It is a tradition at European level that each presidency formulates several own 
priorities, and in this case the ministerial cabinet formulated “sustainable materials management” as 
one of the environmental spearheads for the Belgian presidency. In July 2010 an informal 
Environmental Council in Ghent was devoted to sustainable materials management, which gave the 
Minister an opportunity to present herself nationally and internationally with the theme. During the 
formal EU Environment Council in December 2010, she succeeded in introducing language that links 
the EU 2020 Strategy and its flagship initiative on resource efficiency to “system innovation” and “the 
creation of a multi-actor transition platform on resource efficiency.”  
Furthermore, exactly during the presidency, OVAM organised and hosted a high-profile OECD 
workshop on sustainable materials management. The result and visibility during the EU presidency  
together with the OECD workshop, contributed to a political confidence in the potential of the 
materials storyline. Early 2011 the Minister of the Environment proposed sustainable materials 
management as her flagship for a new socio-economic innovation Program of the Flemish government, 
called Vlaanderen in Actie (VIA, Flanders in Action), in that way positioning materials as an essential 
part of the transformation and innovation of the Flemish economy. This resulted at 6 June 2011 in a 
Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management where industry, knowledge centres and other 
                                                          
2 This obviously differs from the cases on which Kingdon’s theory is built, i.e. agenda-setting at US federal level. 
No higher authority can oblige the US federal government to adopt legislation. 
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societal partners signed a Declaration in which they engaged themselves to work towards a Materials 
Pact and an operational plan on sustainable materials. 
Meanwhile, consultations had been going on for a final important step, namely the replacement of the 
Waste Decree by a Materials Decree. When the text of the Materials Decree reached the government 
table in June 2011, the well-known language of the waste hierarchy is extended with language on 
materials and material cycles. The explanatory memorandum explicitly refers to the need to develop 
a sustainable materials economy in the decades to come and to capitalize on upcoming trends at EU 
and OECD level: “The final goal is to design material cycles that stay within ecological carrying capacity 
and generate wellbeing for current and future generations. This requires a far-reaching integrated 
policy that is known as ‘sustainable materials policy’ or ‘sustainable management of material cycles’” 
(Vlaamse Regering, 2010, our translation). In a departure from the EU Framework Directive, the 
Materials Decree introduces terminology such as “materials”, “material cycle” and “life cycle thinking” 
that should make it possible in future to anchor materials thinking. 
By the time the Materials Decree was approved by the government on 24 June 2011, the combination 
of all these streams had laid a solid political and administrative foundation for the new orientation. 
Furthermore, the whole process and the different evolutions had also led to active involvement of all 
important stakeholders. This is confirmed by the approval mid 2012 of the Vlaams 
Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials Program), a collaborative Program between government, 
industry, science and civil society, coordinated by OVAM, to make “a transition to sustainable materials 
management”. 
 
3.4. 2011-2017: from sustainable materials policy to circular economy 
By mid 2012, the situation in Flemish waste and materials policy had become quite interesting. On the 
one hand, the waste regime with its policies, actors, institutions, rules, practices, infrastructures and 
technologies was still standing firmly. These developed over decades and cannot simply be changed 
overnight by a few government decisions. On the other hand, the government had replaced the old 
legislation with a Materials Decree, in which the waste hierarchy is extended with materials policy and 
it had set up a new Program with a new governance arrangement, alongside the waste regime, to start 
up and give content to this new sustainable materials policy. 
The new governance arrangement that was set up with the Flemish Materials Program, contained 
three new institutions, under general coordination of the waste agency OVAM.  
 In Agenda2020, all major stakeholders gathered to develop a short- to medium-term action 
Program consisting of ambitious multi-stakeholder projects. For these projects, ten themes 
were identified : sustainable design, transparent materials cycles, smart cooperation, smart 
investment, better regulation, sustainable housing and building, sustainable chemistry and 
plastics in a permanent cycle, bio-based economy, critical metals in a permanent cycle, new 
materials in a permanent cycle. 
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 Plan C had gone through a difficult period in 2010-2011, but was revived as a non-profit 
organisation and given the task to provide inspiration for the long-term orientation of the 
Materials Program. Transition management as approach was abandoned, but the working 
philosophy remained embedded in transition ideas. Its three core activities were defined as 
visioning, activating a learning network, and setting up transition experiments. Most of its 
activities were geared towards the development of new business models for sustainable 
materials management. An important reason behind that orientation is the prominent role 
that several business frontrunners take up in the new organisation. 
 A research consortium SuMMA (Sustainable Materials Management) was approved for a 4-
year period, with researchers from different Flemish universities, to back up the Program with 
policy-relevant research strongly focused on monitoring, economic aspects and legal 
instruments. 
All in all, the change in discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is undeniable. It is 
not only taken up in the Materials Decree and propagated by OVAM as main government actor, it also 
found support with all actors involved in the waste/materials system: different sectors of the industry, 
knowledge actors such as universities and technological institute VITO, advisory councils and NGO’s. 
Politically, the construction of this discourse coalition benefited from the possibility to link it to ongoing 
developments at European level and to the innovation and green economy debate at Flemish level. 
There is of course an important caveat to be made. While the Plan C discourse until 2010 was still a 
mixture of transformative and ecological modernisation elements, the transformative elements have 
been largely filtered out in the discourse of the Flemish Materials Program (although elements 
remained in the new Plan C). In the analysis of Paredis (2013), the combined influence of developments 
such as the new European Waste Directive, the EU 2020 strategy, the concern of industry and policy-
makers over the worldwide competition for resources, and the innovation discourse for the Flemish 
economy – discourses that are often co-shaped by agendas of competitiveness and liberalisation – 
were stronger that the transition management process Plan C and supplanted the transformative ideas 
of Plan C’s agenda. 
It is the governance arrangement of the Flemish Materials Program that in 2016 would be awarded 
the Circulars Award (in the category “governments, cities and regions”) at the World Economic Forum 
in Davos. However, by 2016, the Program was in turmoil and negotiations were going on about 
restructuring the set-up as well as redefining its contents. 
Three important evolutions accounted for that: the new discourse of the circular economy that after 
2013 quickly conquered Europe and was introduced in EU policy when the European Commission 
launched the Circular Economy Package in December 2015; a new Flemish government (elected in 
2014) that first seemed to abandon long-term policies, but then in March 2016 approved a transversal 
long-term policy package, Visie 2050 (Vision 2050), in which the circular economy was defined as one 
of the transition spearheads; and a difficult governance trajectory for the Materials Program, in 
particular in developing the Agenda2020 in co-production between regime actors (while on the other 




The first evolution: the introduction of the concept of the circular economy. The concept existed longer 
of course, but the 2012 and 2013 reports of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, presented at the World 
Economic Forum, launched an interpretation of the CE that seemed to convince a lot of policy-makers 
and the business world alike. It presents the CE as an economic orientation full of win-win 
opportunities, economically, ecologically and socially: it boost competitiveness and growth, creates 
jobs, saves resources and reduces CO2. The publications of EMF sparkled a debate, new research and 
new policy ideas about the potential of the circular economy. One of the main results of the interest 
in the CE is the 2015 plan of the European Commission ‘Closing the loop – an EU action plan for the 
Circular Economy’. 
The new terminology is at Flemish level quickly picked up by Plan C. Within a few months, the 
terminology of “sustainable materials economy” and “sustainable materials management” is 
abandoned in favour of “circular economy”. In February 2014, Plan C publishes an e-book Product – 
Dienst, nieuwe businessmodellen in de circulaire economie (Product-Service, new business models in 
het circular economy) that introduces the concept to its network and that presents a lot of innovative 
practices in Flanders and Europe. With its publications and activities – such as conferences, circular 
business classes and an additive design challenge – Plan C becomes the main reference in Flanders for 
ideas and practices about the circular economy, actively supported by OVAM. Meanwhile, the 
development of the Agenda2020 – the multi-stakeholder platform mainly consisting of regime actors 
– goes a lot slower and is perturbed by competing visions of what should get priority, who should act 
first and who can or is willing to invest how much in the Program. Although quite some experiments 
are set up, and although the need for a circular economy is felt, as well as the need to cooperate, 
changing the waste and materials system challenges a lot of established interests. 
Then in 2014, general elections at Belgian and regional level, shake up the political system. The Flemish 
nationalist party N-VA wins the elections and heads the new Flemish coalition government. The exiting 
Minster of the Environment, who championed the sustainable materials orientation, remains in office. 
For several months, it is unclear however in how far the new government is willing to support long-
term strategic policies and continue some of the policy lines that were decided in the previous 
government. However, from early 2015 onwards, the government works on a long-term policy plan 
that will be presented as Visie 2050 in March 2016. It defines seven transitions for Flanders, the circular 
economy being one of them, that should set Flanders on a path to a “strong, social, open, resilient and 
international” region where prosperity and wellbeing are created in a “smart, innovative and 
sustainable way and where everybody counts”. 
For each of the seven transition processes a new governance arrangement has to be created. This 
provides an opportunity to rethink the Flemish Materials Program. During months, possible structures, 
actors, responsibilities, contents and financing are discussed. One of the questions is e.g. whether Plan 
C should remain an independent organisation or whether it should become the core of the new 
structure and for that reason be embedded within OVAM. The new governance arrangement was 




Once again, through the multiple streams lens, we see how several streams combine to ease a new 
step in policy development. Obviously, the development of a discourse and of policy at EU level were 
important, but they were also actively translated by actors at Flemish level, in particular Plan C and 
OVAM. Developments in the new Flemish government first seemed problematic for long-term 
strategies, but the approval of Visie 2050 opened a policy window that provided opportunities to 
launch a new governance arrangement focused on the circular economy. Civil servants connected to 
OVAM and Plan C, and not in the least important industrial leaders and organisations – who had 
become convinced of the economic opportunities of the CE – actively intervened with the government 
to create a new governance arrangement. 
 
3.5. 2017 and beyond: breakthrough of the circular economy? But with which imaginary? 
Circular Flanders differs in some important aspects from the Flemish Materials Program. First, Circular 
Flanders no longer solely resides under the Minister of the Environment, but the Minister of Economy 
has been included as well. This was a strong demand from the business community. Thematically, the 
Materials Program strongly focused on closing of material loops. In its Visie 2050, the government 
decided to broaden the themes for Circular Flanders and included water, energy, food, space and the 
development of the bio-economy. The three pillars of the Materials Program (Agenda2020, Plan C, 
Agenda2020) are integrated in one delivery unit, with an operational team of around 15 persons, under 
the wings of OVAM (but the research team of the former SuMMa remains connected to the 
participating universities and retains some independence). The former non-profit organisation Plan C 
has thus disbanded itself, and its personnel has been integrated in the operational team. The former 
director of Plan C has been appointed “transition manager” and head of the team3. Finally, the strategic 
orientation and thematic priorities of Circular Flanders will be discussed in a public-private steering 
group, which consists of the major stakeholders from government, industry, ngo’s and science. The 
steering group or the operational team can take the initiative to set up project groups. For 2017 and 
2018, three major themes have been chosen that guide the activities: circular purchasing, circular city, 
and circular business. 
A preliminary analysis of the discourse in Circular Flanders and the imaginary it projects, shows a 
strongly technologically driven and economically focused project. It strongly echoes eco-modernist 
ideas: a circular economy can be attained without fundamentally changing economic structures, power 
relations and decision making. Important drivers are business, markets and technology, although 
obviously in the Flemish version, the government (with OVAM as central actor) has a key role in guiding 
the processes, setting the rules, supporting scientific research and financing projects and experiments. 
Although some civil society actors are involved, the public-private steering group is dominated by 
major business actors and government. Still, in the projects that are funded and in the “doers” that 
are presented as examples on the website, a broader diversity can be observed, where also non-profit, 
social and cultural projects are presented as part of the circular economy. 
                                                          
3 Although at the time of writing this paper, she had decided to resign and change jobs. 
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4. (Preliminary) discussion and conclusions 
In our introduction, we proposed the hypothesis that the circular economy is more than just another 
policy, but that it can best be described as a socio-technical imaginary: the future it projects seems to 
imply a collective reimagining of our social lives and social order. This has consequences because 
imaginaries do political work: they are visions of what is good and desirable, and in that way they 
influence investment decisions and innovation policies; they legitimise which actors should be included 
in a political community; they inform the role of technology and science. Before a particular imaginary 
stabilizes and becomes dominant, there are usually a range of potential or emergent visions, that are 
competing for influence, each of which could potentially become dominant (Birch, 2016). The question 
then becomes how and which sociotechnical imaginary becomes dominant and what this implies in 
terms of actors, policies, technologies, power, practices and so on. 
Building on a series of case studies, Jasanoff (2015) argues that sociotechnical imaginaries go roughly 
through four phases: origins, embedding, resistance and extension. Although there is a lot of discourse 
about the circular economy, the actual implementation and practices are still in an early phase of 
development. This is a moment where different emerging imaginaries can still be seen competing. To 
understand the dynamics and role of imaginaries, Jasanoff claims that contextualization in time and 
space is important, because it is in a specific context of historically grown structures, institutions, ideas 
and beliefs that imaginaries are made concrete. Therefore, the specific context of Flanders, which is 
recognized as one of the frontrunners in the development of the circular economy, can teach a lot 
about the emerging controversies and the socio-political questions that surface in the early transition 
phase of the CE.  We used a combination of Kingdon’s multiple stream analysis and Hajer’s discourse 
analysis to study how the imaginary of the circular economy built on earlier concepts such as 
sustainable materials management, how over the last ten years they have risen on the policy agenda, 
how they were translated in new policies and institutions, and which discursive struggles were and are 
still shaping this development. What did we learn from this analysis? 
When comparing the situation of 2005 with that of 2017, it is obvious that the governance structure 
has changed and that a new discourse with new rules (such as the Materials Decree) has entered the 
system. Early on, the transition management process Plan C played an important role in composing a 
discourse about a sustainable materials system, creating a network of frontrunners and setting up 
experiments. However, the streams analysis showed how a lot of couplings had to be made between 
different developments at different levels to move things forward. The European level was important 
several times, amongst other things with the EU Waste Framework Directive in 2008 and the Circular 
Economy Package in 2015. Developments in Flemish politics were important and the opportunities 
these provided. Although they cannot control the events, the role of policy entrepreneurs (e.g. in 
OVAM and in Plan C) is important, because they have to be ready to hook their ideas and approaches 
to policy windows that come along. As Kingdon remarks: ”Individuals do not control waves, but can 
ride them. Individuals do not control events or structures, but can anticipate them and bend them to 
their purposes to some degree” (Kingdon 2011, p. 225). This is nicely visible in the Plan C case and the 
shift to a materials regime. The Plan C process was important in Flanders in maturing the minds of 
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relevant actors for the sustainable materials discourse. When the EU Waste Framework directive came 
along, entrepreneurial civil servants in OVAM saw a possibility to connect this European obligation 
with the materials discourse. A few years later, the combination of the EU developments around the 
Circular Economy Package with the ambition of the Flemish governments to initiate transitions for 
Vision 2050, created possibilities for a new governance arrangement (Circular Flanders) to promote 
the circular economy. This work of policy entrepreneurs is essential, because the coupling does not fall 
out of the air. It is the result of a lot of preparatory work that is usually done without a clear view of 
the final result and without certainty of success. 
The discourse analysis shows how the discourse about sustainable materials management that was 
originally introduced by Plan C, exhibits a mixture of eco-modernist and transformative elements. The 
discourse elements could catch on because similar ideas were also present in other forums and levels 
and could be linked to the new European Waste Directive, to the EU 2020 strategy, to the concern of 
industry and policy-makers about the worldwide competition for resources, and to the felt need to 
innovate the Flemish economy and society. When the concept of the circular economy entered the 
stage around 2013, this found a fertile ground in Flanders, where in the Flemish Materials Program 
Plan C had been given the explicit task to introduce ideas and visions for the long term. Furthermore, 
all important actors in the waste and materials system had already committed to the idea of 
sustainable materials management. The new concept was thus quickly adapted and used as basis for 
a new governance arrangement, Circular Flanders. 
However, in the course of ten years, only the ecological modernisation elements have been retained 
in what is becoming the new regime discourse. The embedment in a context characterised by 
discourses of competitiveness and liberalisation, filtered out the transformational elements from the 
Plan C discourse but retained the ecological modernisation elements. At least at policy level, the 
imaginary of the circular economy seems thus to be taking on an eco-modernist orientation. Practices 
and niches exist that seem to be inspired by other imaginaries of the circular economy (e.g. in the 
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